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Generating cryptographic initialization vectors from SSD wear metrics 
ABSTRACT 
Data encryption on storage devices is achieved by the application of a suitable cipher 
mode. Many commonly used cipher modes require an initialization vector (IV). An IV is not 
secret, yet it must not be reused with the same encryption key in order to preserve 
confidentiality. A storage device can generate and store a unique IV alongside each encrypted 
block; however, this capability is not commonly available in mass market implementations. 
Instead, encrypted storage devices commonly use cipher modes that don’t require an IV, e.g., 
XTS. However, these have well-known vulnerabilities. This disclosure presents techniques that 
deterministically derive IVs for block encryption such that they are not stored, yet preserve the 
property of never being reused. 
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BACKGROUND 
Data encryption on storage devices is achieved by the application of a suitable cipher 
mode in order to forestall exploits of well-known vulnerabilities. Many commonly used cipher 
modes require an initialization vector (IV). An IV is not secret, but must not be reused with the 
same encryption key in order to preserve confidentiality.  
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A storage device can generate and store a unique IV alongside each encrypted block; 
however, this capability is not commonly available in mass market implementations. Instead, 
encrypted storage devices commonly use cipher modes, such as XTS (XEX-based tweaked-
codebook with ciphertext stealing), which do not require an IV. These have well-known 
weaknesses that IV-based cipher modes avoid.  
DESCRIPTION 
Fig. 1: Organization of a NAND memory 
Fig. 1 shows typical organization of NAND-based non-volatile memories, such as those 
used in solid-state drives (SSD). These memories comprise several pages (102a-c), a page itself 
comprising several blocks (104a-c). A page is indexed by an address (106) expressed as a binary 
string p0p1p2p3.... A block within a page is indexed by an address (108) expressed as a binary 
string b0b1b2b3....  
Data is written in units of blocks and erased in units of pages. A block may be written 
exactly once after its page is erased, and may not be rewritten until the page is erased again. In 
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order to maximize device service life, wear metrics are tracked for use by wear-levelling 
algorithms. One of these metrics is the number of erase cycles for each page. Such a wear metric 
(108) is tracked on a per-block basis using a binary counter w0w1w2w3.... 
Thus, each block has associated with it a page address, a block address, and a counter of 
page-erase cycles. By combining these three numbers - the page address, the block offset, and 
the counter of page erase cycles- the techniques of this disclosure generate a unique IV for each 
block when it is encrypted. For example, the IV for Block m, Page n of Fig. 1 is 
p0p1p2p3...b0b1b2b3...w0w1w2w3....  
Example: A device has 224 pages, 28 blocks per page, and an endurance of one million (< 220) 
program/erase cycles. Per the techniques, a 52-bit IV is constructed by concatenating the 24-bit 
page address, the 8-bit block offset and the 20-bit write counter. 
The initialization vector, as generated by the techniques herein, is unique to the location 
and number of erasures of the underlying block, and hence, is never reused. This IV may be used 
to initialize a cipher mode such as propagating cipher block chaining (PCBC) so that the block 
may be encrypted prior to writing. The IV need not be stored because it can be trivially 
reconstructed. If a wear levelling operation rewrites a block to a different page, then the data is 
decrypted and then re-encrypted with the IV unique to the new location.  
In some implementations, a block encryption system is implemented in the firmware of a 
SSD. In such cases, the firmware has direct access to the physical page addresses, block offsets, 
and erase cycle counts to construct IVs whenever a block is encrypted and written. In some 
implementations, the encryption performed by an operating system. In such cases, the device 
provides access to physical page addresses, block offsets, and erase cycle counts in order for the 
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operating system to calculate IVs. The device also delegates block rewriting for wear-levelling 
purposes to the operating system. 
SSDs are used both in server computers as well as client devices, e.g., portable devices 
such as smartphones, tablets, laptops, wearable devices, etc. Security best practices require that 
the storage device of such devices be encrypted. The described techniques provide more secure 
cipher modes, offering better protection for encrypted data. The ability to deterministically 
derive IVs allows the cipher modes to be utilized without an increase in storage costs. 
CONCLUSION 
This disclosure presents techniques that deterministically and at no extra cost, derive 
initialization vectors for block encryption such that they are not stored, yet preserve the property 
of never being reused. The techniques have minimal storage overhead, improve confidentiality, 
and are usable in portable, cloud-based, and other types of storage devices. 
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